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Foreword
I am sitting with my grandchild in the park on a fadingAustralian summer afternoon.
The sulphur-crested cockatoos screech as they squabble over the last of the sunlit
eucalypt branches and she notices them as they fly over her, their powerful wings
beating. “What is flying,” she asks, “and why can’t we do it?” For a moment I am
tempted to respond to the latter question with “We don’t have the genes for flight”.
But not only would this not help, indeed could not help, it also tears that question
away from the initial one. While evolution as changes in gene frequencies can track
the requisite gene changes involved, the actual features of organisms that make flight
possible are left out. Genes can tell us about the appearance, spread and evolution of
the fact of flight but they cannot in themselves tell us what flight actually is, namely
the production of suitably spatially distributed and temporally coordinated thrust
and lift. To understand that involves understanding, for example, how musculature
must be recruited and organised to work wings that provide both lift and thrust,
how skeletons must be both organised to effect tail-wing coordination, and be light
enough to lift yet strong enough to brace the musculature in flight, to land on moving
branches without fracturing legs, etc. and much more.
In short, it is to understand the internal organisation of birds. Without that we
are blind to the internal consequences of genetic variation; and without that and
ecological organisation, blind also to its external ecological consequences via the
new sources of food and nests that become available, the spread of seeds via bird
guts and the spread of plants that compete for bird feeding, and so on. Without such
understanding the survival-of-the-fittest engine is left spinning its wheels, its simple
idea of stochastic selection on populational variety left to sort rocks in a river and
straws in the wind as well as gazelle on a savannah but without purchase on the
nature and potential of evolving life.
There are three good reasons to read this book about how life is constituted.First,
its organisational approach to organism is deeply informative, radically different
from current orthodoxy and makes a crucial contribution at an important historical
juncture in science. Second, it provides a detailed, powerful and ultimately elegant
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model of the mutual development of scientific and philosophical understanding.
Third, the pellucid, penetrating and parsimonious character of the writing makes
a text dense in precisely characterised ideas quite accessible, including to a non-
expert audience.
The last of these features is uncommon, the second is decidedly unusual and the
first quite unique. They are all discussed a little further below. If you have an interest
in understanding how our world works, or a specific interest in the foundations of
biological science and/or philosophy of biology, or in organised complex systems
more widely (robotics, cybernetics, intelligent agents, etc.) then this book is
for you.
The book expounds and explores the claim that a distinctive organisation is the
hallmark of life and that organisation ultimately provides a framework for under-
standing the evolution of life forms, of agency and of intelligence/intentionality.
A quick review of chapter content can be found towards the close of the Introduc-
tion. As you might expect, it starts with the basics, closure and self-maintenance,
then a complex form of closure called autonomy, the foundational organisation of
all life, and then explores the still more complex topics just noted.Moreno especially
has pursued the organisational approach consistently over decades and, with Mossio
as collegial co-writer, this book is the summative outcome. I have helped to make
the odd contribution to this position myself, partly on its systems foundations
(organisation), but largely concerned with the adaptive roots of cognition (see
references, this book), and in my view this book is unique in offering the first
high quality conceptually integrated, empirically grounded, in depth exposition of
this approach. It shows just how far the organisational perspective can take us in
understanding the nature and evolution of life (answer: very far) and its exposition
bids fair to remain the standard for some time to come.
The Organisational Approach
Listing genes and gene-trait associations tells you little about how the creatures
that carry the genes are put together. The common presumption is that those latter
answers come after the genetic work is done and will be found by studying the
biochemical detail. Then whatever organisation there is will drop out as a conse-
quence. But there is another, reverse possibility, one that has been largely neglected,
namely that there are irreducible structures of nested correlated interactions, that
is, organisations, that are key to understanding why the biochemical details are as
they are, genomes included, and that such organisational design is as fundamental
to understanding as is the biochemistry. That is the approach taken here.
Organisation (think car engines) happens when many different parts (cylinders,
cam shafts, fuel injection : : : ) interact in specific, coordinated ways (cylinder
rod rotates on cam shaft, fuel injected into cylinder, : : : ) so as to collectively
support some global functioning (convert chemical potential energy into torque).
It is roughly measured by the numbers of nested layers of different correlations
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among different parts of a system. It is their functional contributions to the overall
organisation of car engines that require the parts to have the shapes, sizes and
material compositions they have. You can study these parts separately but unless you
relate them to their organisation you will not understand their particular features.
Organisation is not the same as order; pure crystals are highly ordered, so uniform
they cannot show any organisation. Neither can gases, because they are too random
to be organised. Organisation lies between the crystal and gas extremes but we don’t
have a good theory that tells us exactly where and why. Some may worry that talk
of organisational constraints is too “airy fairy” and “metaphysical”. But it is just the
opposite, a matter of real dynamics found everywhere, from car engines to cellular
“engines”, for instance, the Krebs Cycle.
In this book the chief exemplar of an organised system is the living cell. The
metabolism of a cell has to completely re-build the cell over time (that is its grand
cycle). This is because, being material, a cell is a thermodynamic engine whose
internal interactions degrade its innards which must then be replaced. But you
don’t get systematic self-replacement without being highly organised to do it: the
particular materials and energy needed for each repair must be available at just
the right location at just the right time, otherwise the cell will malfunction. In a
cell more than 3,000 biochemical reactions are so organised that with each kind
distinctively distributed throughout the cell their joint products re-make the cell,
including themselves (and remove the thermodynamically unavoidable wastes), in
the process also re-making the cell’s capacity to extract from its environment the
resources it needs. Thus at the heart of every cell is, and must be, a massive self-
maintenance organisation cycle, operating under just the right constraints. This kind
of organisation is called autonomy, with its core sense of self-governance applying
all the way “up” from self-restriction by constraints to the more familiar socio-
political notion.
Moreno and Mossio show that such organisation is central to cellular function,
essentially defining all life. They also show that it is the necessary precursor to a
well-defined evolutionary process, rather than the other way around. This is because
the internal organisation of organisms secures the reproducibility of functionality
which permits the inheritable traits, including those for mutant genomes, on
which evolutionary selection operates. The interaction between evolutionary and
developmental dynamics, in the context of epigenetic organisation, once mostly
ignored but now richly studied, throws into stark relief the role of organism
organisation in framing evolutionary process. All this is a relatively new perspective
for evolutionary theorists, whose pure population statistics in themselves discourage
awareness of organismal, communal and ecological organisation (cf. flight, above;
albeit the theory has itself evolved significantly over the past 50 years). Moreno and
Mossio lay out the issues with meticulous care.
Incidentally, it was the twin successes of the explorations of population genetics
and molecular genetics that led to a century-long relative repression of biological
organisation as an object of study, a repression that only really receded this century
when molecular biology had exhausted simple gene sequencing and medicine
simple gene-trait associations and both admitted the study of biosynthetic pathway
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organisation as the next major challenge. Thus this book arrives on the scene at this
epochal moment, just in time to provide a penetrating framework for understanding
what is actually involved in such research.
On that score, note that the science of spatio-temporal organisation of interactions
so as to generate global self-maintenance is itself in its infancy; we know relatively
little about it, but just enough about the incredibly complex ways reactants are
spatially arranged in cells to suppose it is going to be a large, complex and very
difficult domain to understand. But it must come if ever we are to develop a
thorough cellular biology and much else up to truly life-like robotics beyond the
one-dimensional computer-in-a-box toys we focus on at present. (See also Hooker
ed. Philosophy of Complex Systems, North Holland 2011 for further discussion.)
Multicellular Organisation
The emergence of a biochemical organisation capable of regenerative closure, the
cell, is the first decisive step in the evolution of life. A subsequent giant step is the
organisation of groups of cells to formmulticellular organisms. These must organise
their multicellular processes so that cellular metabolism is supported throughout,
hence the presence of a cardiovascular system to deliver oxygen and nutrients where
needed and remove wastes, the presence of renal and lymph systems to manage
toxins and so on. In short, multicellularity requires a set of “higher” organisational
layers on top of cellular ones to obtain a functional organism. (Again, we do not
as yet understand a lot about such organisational constraints, e.g. respiration, that
reach from individual cells across organs and other intermediate organisations, to
the whole organism.) But there is a pay-off for all this overhead.
The distinctive twin advantages of multicellularity lie in its increased capacities
for more complex behaviours and for more interactively open organisation, each
feeding the other, even while closure must still be satisfied for their component
cells. Once cellular communication develops to allow cell specialisation compatibly
with cellular organisational coherence (as above), the way is thrown open to great
increases in both behavioural complexity and interactive openness. The case of
expanded behavioural repertoires is obvious enough. No single cell can fly, for
the good reason that, whether or not it can muster thrust, it cannot control its
surface shape so as to provide lift. But a collection of cells suitably specialised
and interconnected can provide the musculature, cardiovascular support, surface
controllability and so on to fly, powerfully and elegantly.
The case of greater interaction openness is perhaps less obvious but of even
greater significance. Multicellularity has made possible increases in interaction-
led adaption of both inner metabolism and outer environment. In the case of
inner metabolism, multicellular organisms are able to suspend or adapt aspects
of metabolic activity, from speeding up some processes (e.g. removing wastes
before conflict) to slowing down and modifying others (e.g. hibernation in bears),
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sometimes drastically (e.g. consuming internal organs for energy when fat stores are
exhausted in stressful circumstances). Indeed, it is possible for existing organ sys-
tems to be entirely transformed in response to circumstances, as the metamorphosis
of pupae into butterflies so beautifully illustrates. All of this requires over-arching
organisational capacities. In the case of the outer environment, sensory cellular
specialisation permits new ways of inward-bound interaction with the environment,
leading to increased motor metabolic adaptiveness, from movement (e.g. sitting
to running) to fasting, and to new ways of outward-bound interaction with the
environment, like fight/flight, but also altering the environment to ease selection
pressures (mouse holes for mice, etc.). Humans do not even internally manufacture
all of their essential amino acids, relying on these open interaction systems to obtain
them from their environment. (Which means that any constraint closures required
for organism autonomy must be understood relatively to what can be regulated
through external interaction and not only internal metabolic activity.) Just as with
flight, all this also transforms ecological organisation.
In sum, if I might exploit a flight metaphor, when it comes to the expansion of
life on the planet, it may be evolutionary selection that provides the thrust, but it is
organisation that provides the lift. It is, as Howard Pattee taught us, the coordination
of organisational constraints that makes possible the accumulating diversity and
complexity of life. If organisation without evolution is impotent, evolution without
organisation is blind.
Integration of Science and Philosophy
The dominant tradition in (meta-)philosophy is that philosophy and science are
not to be integrated because philosophy provides an a priori normative framework
for the analysis, conduct and evaluation of science whereas science constructs a
posteriori empirical knowledge of the world by applying that framework. But in
practice the development of understanding has rarely (really: never) happened like
this. Philosophers have always borrowed ideas, theories and methods from science,
and vice versa, each fertilising the other, unregarding of the proprieties of doing
so. This has been a GOOD THING for both parties, each informing the other
and keeping it on its toes. A minority naturalist (meta-)philosophy position would
also applaud this intercourse as entirely appropriate. And that is what our authors
consciously practice. Here is what they say (see Introduction): “ : : : the approach
developed in this book lies in between philosophy and theoretical biology. It deals
with philosophical questions, like the nature of autonomy, agency and cognition,
as well as their relations with concepts such as function, norms, teleology and
many others; yet, it addresses these questions in close connection to, or even deeply
entangled with, current scientific research.” What emerges from this rich process
is a coherent, if unfinished, majestic view of life as a subtly mutually entangled,
organised whole from molecules to macro-ecology.
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On Chasing Hares
Like all really interesting books, this book is profoundly incomplete: it starts new
hares (new lines of thought) running on almost every page. This leaves the curious
and/or thoughtful reader to enjoy the pleasure of identifying them and deciding
which ones to follow up. A fine example already occurs in Chap. 1, in the nature
of the closure found in self-regeneration and its relation to dynamical constraints.
This issue is central, for according to the book’s story there is no function or
organisation, properly so-called, without closure (“an organization is by definition
closed and functional”, Chap. 3) and hence no autonomy either. I have previously
mentioned constraints five times, including in characterising autonomy itself, and
closure thrice, as if both notions were well understood. Did you notice any hares
leap?
Closure has been an issue in thinking about autonomous systems from the
beginning (see the summary in their Chap. 1). Founders like Varela emphasised
closure as the distinctive feature of biological organisation and made its discovery
at multicellular levels the key requirement for understanding them, even though
closure was hard to uncover (it was thought to characterise the immune and nervous
systems) and seemed to pull against the increasing interactive and organisational
openness that marks multicellularity (see above). Many (myself included) adopted
a process model: processes are sequences of dynamical states and process closure
occurs where these states cycle through a closed loop of states, returning each time
to an initial state, e.g. the normal or “resting” metabolism state. The cellular Krebs
cycle is again a useful example. The thermodynamic flow, another process, drives
the cycling, thus reconciling openness (flow) with closure (cycling). But Moreno
and Mossio find this unsatisfying (for reasons I leave to the reader to pursue)
and have developed their own distinctive account on which it is constraints that
are closed and not processes, which are open on account of the thermodynamic
flow. By constraint closure is meant, roughly, that the constraints so interrelate
as to reconstitute one another. (So there is still a process cycle, but it is among
constraint conditions, leaving thermodynamic processes to remain open.) To make
the distinction between constraints and processes really sharp, they require that
constraints do not interact, in the sense of exchange energy/materials, with the
thermodynamic flow, only shape its direction. Think of a river flowing between
frictionless banks. For this reason, they characterise constraints as not being
thermodynamic entities and in Chap. 2 they support that by arguing that they are
emergent entities with respect to the thermodynamic flow.
What are constraints, these non-thermodynamic entities that somehow shape the
flow while not being of it? In standard mathematical dynamics constraints appear
in the application of dynamical models where, although not directly represented in
the system dynamics flow equations, they apply forces that constrain the dynamical
possibilities of the flow. When they do not interact with the flow (ironically for
Moreno/Mossio) those forces can be calculated and, like all modelled forces, are
grounded in physical configurations of matter and/or fields of the same sort as make
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up the system being modelled, just located externally to it. But in autonomous sys-
tems all the matter/fields that give rise to those constraint forces have themselves to
be assembled within the autonomous system itself in consequence of its constrained
flow. Precisely that is the trick of autonomous self-regeneration, and a problem for
understanding constraints.
For this means that constraints repeatedly degrade and have to be physically
reconstructed, waste molecules literally replaced with new ones, etc. That is, the
system itself must do work on its own constraints, or anyway on the matter/fields
that give rise to them. Think of a real river that erodes and reconstructs its own banks
as it flows. But that raises a first important issue: we have no workable methods
for formulating the dynamics of systems that do work on their own constraints,
the standard techniques of Lagrangian dynamics break down in this case. (See
my “On the import of constraints in complex dynamical systems”, Foundations
of Physics, 2013, and earlier in Hooker (2011) above.) So how exactly are we
to understand these systems and their self-reconstituting constraints? (Hare 1)
This issue applies much more widely than biology, of course, since the self-
formation and transformation of internal constraints is a major feature of complex
dynamics anywhere (Hare 2). And, as noted above, but not in the book, apparently
multicellular closed constraints have to be understood relative to an organism’s
interactional (agency) capacities, which itself depends on its functional, so closure,
organisation (Hare 3).
And the manner in which Moreno/Mossio move to avoid facing the problem
for autonomous dynamics (by requiring that constraints do no work and have
none done on them) raises a second important issue: since constraints have to be
reconstituted there are presumably periods of time when work is being done on
at least some of them (on their supports): what kind of dynamics then applies
to them and the flow? (Hare 4) These concerns are reinforced by a vivid picture
in Chap. 3 of self-maintenance extended over time, for both intra-organism and
inter-generational autonomous organisations, reinforced by the argument in Chap.
6 that developmental processes are necessary to multicellular constitution. (There
is another group of hares loitering around these ideas.) But perhaps it also offers
a way out in its conception of transmission of causal organisation over time that
does not seem to require continuous satisfaction of closure (Hare 5). Even then, the
hare 4 issue would remain to be addressed. And a further issue arises: considering
time periods during which various proportions of constraints do not exist as such
because they are doing work on some part of the system (including regenerating
other constraints) and/or having work done on them (being regenerated), how large
can those time spans be before system autonomy is considered disrupted and no
longer explanatory of that system, and why? (Hare 6)
No doubt the authors will have anticipated such issues and been thinking about
responses. (Their remarks on river banks and in a few other places reflect my earlier
probings.) Irrespective, these questions should not be considered criticism of the
book; to the contrary, they represent questions that could not be asked until the
refined treatment of constraint closure Moreno and Mossio propose was available.
And while there are lots of hares to startle, as there must inevitably be given our
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ignorance and a penetrating book, the present book succeeds in blunting many of
the criticisms (including mine) made of the organisational approach. For instance,
theirs is a position that takes the nature and role of biological organisation far beyond
simple self-organisation of the kind beloved of the complex-behaviour-from-simple-
rules-among-many-components tradition in the physics of complex systems. Indeed,
that latter kind of process includes forming crystal lattices and like, so in fact it has
no direct relationship at all with the kind of nested-complementary-correlations-
and-regulations-among-disparate-components that this book is concerned with. The
former could in principle be extended to encompass biology via bringing all
organic chemistry under atomic modelling, but even then “organisation” in “self-
organisation” remains a misnomer. (Two more hares.) Again, the book’s position
takes external interaction (individual and evolutionary) as seriously as internal
organisation, whereas there are other traditions (discussed in the book) that are more
closed-off to its importance, e.g. as illustrated above for understandingmulticellular
capacities. Nonetheless, we may still wonder whether the full extent of the
interactive openness has been appreciated: what would their account of consuming
internal organs under stress or adapting closure to environmental extraction of amino
acids look like? (Another hare.) Finally, here the organisational approach is used
to illuminate a thoroughly embodied approach to mind, for example with a deep
connection developed to body plan, that counters the concern with “lifting off”
an abstracted organisational pattern that has only nebulous connection to nervous
system dynamics, organisation and functioning. However, there is still room to
wonder about how neural phenomena characteristic of neural networks, whether
distributed representations or waves, fit with organisation. (Another hare.) In these
and like ways, this book represents a marked step forward in developing the
organisational approach.
Meanwhile, there is the serious fun of chasing down such interesting and
epistemically rewarding hares.
Conclusion
The authors describe my review of the draft of this book as, among other things,
“relentlessly critical” (see closing remarks, Introduction). This is a compliment to
both parties. A decade or more earlier I had entertained the prospect of a book on
autonomy and discussed the idea with Moreno – on one occasion after an ocean
swim near my Australian home and over a little local sauvignon blanc with freshly
shucked Sydney Rock oysters, which he commented were “the best oysters I have
ever tasted”. (The preceding year at his coastal village I ate the best turbot I had
ever tasted.) I hopefully suggested that the book could begin by understanding life
through a series of ever tightening dynamical and thermodynamical constraints cul-
minating with a notion of autonomy as the unique allowed evolvable organisation,
just as the Krebs Cycle is a solution to capturing free energy for the cell. “Go ahead!”
he said, “Be quick! I shall eagerly await your analysis.” Of course, he knew better
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from years of trying just how hard that scientific task would be, still impossibly hard
today where, for example, simple chemical cell models are still under development.
I should have paid more attention to the quiet twinkle in his eye.
But we can all pay attention to what has been achieved. This book has thrust
and lift. It is a masterly account of the organisational foundations of life, a splendid
flight in the firmament of conception and understanding.
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy Cliff Hooker
Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities
PhD (Physics, Sydney University)
PhD (Philosophy, York University, Canada)
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Introduction
Life as Autonomy
If we were to point out in a fewwords what characterises the phenomenonof life, we
would probablymention the amazing plasticity and robustness of living systems, the
innumerable ways they adapt, and their capacity to recover from adverse conditions.
All these capacities have been on the surface of our planet since the origins of
life, and for this reason we have become accustomed to seeing life as something
almost “normal”. And yet, looking at it from a more global perspective, life is
quite an extraordinary phenomenon. In a short period of time (compared to the
history of the universe), in a very tiny portion of the cosmos, a set of entities
has managed to attain extremely improbable configurations, to keep them in far-
from-equilibrium conditions, and to thrive under these conditions: self-organising,
proliferating, diversifying, and even increasing their complexity. Furthermore, this
persistently organised system (or, rather, this global system formed by millions
of local, individualised systems, which combine decay and reproduction) has
been able to deploy a set of selective forces, modifying its environment so as to
enhance its own maintenance. In a word, life seems to be at the same time an
extraordinarily precarious (and improbable) phenomenon and a powerful, robust,
and easily expansive one.
Actually, this astonishing capacity to maintain highly organised systems seems to
be the easiest way to recognise universally living matter beyond the specificities of
terrestrial life. Present-day theories estimate that the universe came into being 13.7
billion years ago, while our planet was formed approximately 9 billion years later.
In this period of time, or perhaps later, forms of organisation similar to early living
systems on our planet possibly appeared in other parts of the universe. Indeed, if life
appeared on our planet when certain physicochemical conditions were met, other
planets with similar conditions could also have once supported forms of life. This
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raises the question of how we could recognise these hypothetical extra-terrestrial
living systems, and what would be the essential features of any form of (possible)
life. In the last decades, this question has been widely discussed.
For some (Cleland and Chyba 2007), it is impossible to say how such “essential
features of life” should be conceived, because we only know life as it manifests itself
on Earth. Yet, if what we mean by “life” is anymaterial organisation that has evolved
from non-living physicochemical systems (therefore obeying the universal laws of
physics and chemistry) and has attained at least a degree of complexity capable of
generating the properties we associate with the simplest forms of terrestrial life, we
should be capable of recognising it anywhere in our universe, regardless of how
differently these systems may be constituted (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). At the same
time, the huge variety of life forms that have appeared during the very long history
of life on our planet (Ward and Brownlee 2004) might downplay the argument that
we have had access only to a unique example of life among a hypothetically huge set
of extra-terrestrial biological systems. Be that as it may, when facing the question
of the nature of life, we could not do otherwise than formulate theories based on –
and tested against – life as we know it.
It is because of its capacity to achieve and maintain higher degrees of complexity
that physical sciences find it very difficult to explain how life has originated. For
this reason, the question of the origin of life is deeply entangled with the question
of its very nature. Is there some law or principle in the physical world that allows
explaining the emergence of life as a necessity or, as Monod (1970) thought, is the
origin of life so unlikely that it is almost a miracle? How could inert matter originate
something that seems to be so deeply different in its properties?
From the perspective of the physical sciences, explaining life is a highly
challenging task because the more complex a system is, the less probable it becomes
both in its appearance and its persistence. At first approximation, it might be easy
to understand how simple building blocks may spontaneously generate composite
stable structures (atoms, molecules, macromolecules : : : ) due to different levels of
forces (Simon 1969): as a result of these interactions, increasingly complex stable
structures appear (endowed, in many cases, with new interactive properties, not
present in their separate parts, such as superconductivity, chemical affinity : : : ).
As the complexity of the structures increases, however, its maintenance becomes
a problem: thermal noise increases fragility and, moreover, the coincidence or
coordination of many highly specific processes becomes increasingly unlikely.
It is true that recent advances in thermodynamics explain the formation of
composite aggregates (called “dissipative structures”), whose parts are tied together
without intrinsic forces, ensuring their cohesion in far-from-equilibrium conditions.
However, as we will discuss at length in this book, these systems appear spon-
taneously and persist only when specific external boundary conditions are met
and, more importantly, they lack internal complexity and functionality. In contrast,
biology deals with highly complex systems, so that something more than initial
conditions and fundamental laws seems to be required to explain a world of complex
biological systems.
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Assuming that nature does not make leaps and that, therefore, there is a contin-
uum between non-living matter and life,1 there should be explanatory principles of
the transition from non-living to living matter. As Fry (2000) has pointed out, the
fundamental problem of the origin of life lies in the tension between the principle
of continuity and the difficulty of explaining the obvious differences between non-
living and living matter. If the origin of life is a legitimate scientific question (and
we think it is), one should look for a theory that bridges the gap between physics
and biology. In particular, since living beings are made of the same constituents
as non-living entities, what is the nature of the organisation that enables them to
achieve, maintain, and propagate such a high degree of complexity? And what are
the consequences of this extraordinary capacity?
On our planet, life has developed for a long period of time and has colonised the
most diverse environments – from the deep oceans or even several kilometres under
the Earth’s crust to the upper levels of the atmosphere; from the hottest environments
(over 100ıC) to extremely acid or radioactive ones. And if we consider life from an
historical perspective, it is even more impressive how it has managed to adapt to
the successive catastrophic events that have occurred on our planet during the last
3.5 billion years. Admittedly, only the simplest forms of life are capable of such
extreme robustness and versatility; at the same time, these forms of life have also
been able to innovate and evolve towards increasingly higher levels of complexity.
Life, as it has developed on our planet, has gradually integrated more and more
levels of organisation (from unicellular life to colonies, multicellular organisms and
societies).2
How can we explain all this diversity and complexity? Ever since Dobzhansky’s
(1973) famous dictum that “nothing in Biology makes sense except in the light of
evolution”, mainstream thinking in biology has seen evolution by natural selection
as the source of diversity at every level of biological organisation. Indeed, the
unfolding of an evolutionary process by natural selection, based on heritable genetic
mechanisms, allows life to explore many possible combinations and solutions in
order to survive. And the evolution-centred view of life has been so dominant that
the idea of organism (which played a key role in nineteenth century biology) has
become almost dispensable (Morange 2003). However, in a very fundamental sense,
we shall argue at length that the reality is rather the opposite: evolutionary mecha-
nisms operate because they are embodied in the complex organisation of organisms.
Thus, if we look for the roots of the impressive capacity of life to proliferate, to
1Philosophically, this assumption amounts to adopting a monistic stance. Chapter. 2 is devoted to a
detailed analysis of the position of the autonomous perspective developed in this book in the debate
on emergence, reduction, and related issues.
2Nowadays we know that this process of diversification and complexification is not a contingent
fact, but rather something “inscribed” in the evolutionary nature of life. As Gould (1994) has
argued, evolution is not aimed towards an increase in complexity; in fact, life originates in the
simplest form and many organisms have remained successfully as such. However, a few organisms
occasionally introduced innovations, “thus extending the right tail in the distribution of complexity.
Many always move to the left, but they are absorbed within space already occupied”.
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create an enormous variety of forms, to adapt to completely different environments,
and particularly, to increase its complexity, we shall focus on individual living
entities, namely on organisms, because evolution3 as an explanatory mechanism
actually presupposes the existence of organisms. As Varela (1979) pointed out,
evolutionary thought, through its emphasis on diversity, reproduction, and the species in
order to explain the dynamics of change, has obscured the necessity of looking at the
autonomous nature of living units for the understanding of biological phenomenology.
Also I think that the maintenance of identity and the invariance of defining relations in
the living unities are at the base of all possible ontogenetic and evolutionary transformation
in biological systems (p. 5).
As Rosen also emphasised, the crucial question for understanding life lies in
the nature of its organisation.4 It is true that any known living being cannot
have appeared except as a result of a long history of reproductive events, since
such a complex organisation can only be originated through an accumulative
historical process and, furthermore, that its long-term sustainability also requires
inter-generational entailments. This is clearly reflected in the fact that, in order
to be operational, genetic components (which contribute to specify the metabolic
machinery and organisation of single biological entities) must be shaped through a
process that involves a large number of individual systems and many consecutive
generations, or reproductive steps. Yet, this does not mean that the organisation
of organisms should be neglected; on the contrary, a theory of living organisation
is fundamental for understanding how these evolutionary mechanisms could have
appeared and how they could work.
A theory of the living based on the concept of organism aims to review the
concept of evolution and its role in a new way, attempting to overcome the
dichotomy – and often opposition – between what since Mayr’s (1961) work is
called the biology of proximate causes and that of ultimate causes. Our vindication
of the central role played by the notion of organism in biology should be placed
within this wider perspective, in which the explanatory emphasis is placed on
organisation. As Hooker and Christensen (1999) have highlighted, in order to
3The term ‘evolution’ could be understood in a very broad sense, just as an historical process of
causal entailments. However, since Darwin, the term evolution has acquired a more restrictive
sense, referring to specific mechanisms of inheritance and several other conditions (see for
example, Godfrey-Smith (2009)). We will discuss the relation between autonomy and evolution
in Chap. 5; here, we use the more restrictive sense of the term.
4“We cannot answer the question ( : : : ) ‘Why is a machine alive?’ with the answer ‘Because its
ancestors were alive’. Pedigrees, lineages, genealogies, and the like, are quite irrelevant to the basic
question. Ever more insistently over the past century, and never more so than today, we hear the
argument that biology is evolution; that living systems instantiate evolutionary processes rather
than life; and ironically, that these processes are devoid of entailment, immune to natural law, and
hence outside of science completely. To me it is easy to conceive of life, and hence biology, without
evolution” (Rosen 1991: 254–55).
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properly understand the evolution of biological systems, traditional approaches need
to be embedded within a more general dynamical-organisational theory.5
Therefore, it is at the level of organisms, understood as cohesive and spatially
bounded entities, that the biological domain’s organised complexity is fundamen-
tally expressed. Seen from the perspective of their relations with their environment,
individual organisms are systems capable of acting for their own benefit, of
constituting an identity that distinguishes them from their environment (at the same
time as they continue interacting with it as open, far-from-equilibrium systems).
This capacity of living beings to act for their own benefit follows from their peculiar
form of organisation.
Living beings are systems continuously producing their own chemical compo-
nents, and with these components they build their organs and functional parts. In a
word, their organisation is maintaining itself. This is why living systems cannot
stop their activity: they intrinsically tend to work or they disintegrate. Actually,
this inherent tendency of living entities to promote their own existence – to act
on their own behalf – could be related to the idea of the conatus, to which Spinoza
(1677/2002) refers to designate the innate inclination of any entity to continue to
exist and enhance itself.6
The root of this drive to persist lies in the principles of biological organisation.As
Jonas (1966/2001) pointed out, the organisation of living systems is characterised
by the inseparability between what they are – their “being” – and what they do –
their “doing”. This feature is reflected in their metabolism, which consists of a
set of processes that allow them to build and replace their structures, grow and
reproduce, and respond to their environments. Metabolism is the ongoing activity
by which living beings continuously self-produce (and eventually, re-produce),
self-repair, and maintain themselves. Unlike the Cartesian argument (which has
had so much influence during modernity7) that living beings are like man-made
machines, Kant was the first author who defended the view that organisms are
5As a matter of fact, an organisational perspective seems to be taking shape in the new evolutionary
developmental biology, which studies how the dynamics of development determine the phenotypic
variation arising from genetic variation and how this affects phenotypic evolution (Laubichler and
Maienschein 2007).
6As Spinoza (1677/2002) writes, “Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own
being” (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6). This is understood as an intrinsic tendency or force to continue to
exist. Striving to persevere is not merely something that a thing does in addition to other activities
it might happen to undertake. Rather, striving is “nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself”
(Ethics, part 3, prop. 7). See Duchesneau (1974) for an in-depth analysis of Spinoza’s account of
living systems, and a comparison with the Cartesian one.
7Actually, the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, which subsumed the
biological domain within a global mechanistic vision of nature, facilitated a scientific research
programme for studying living systems. It should be underscored that, while Descartes’ metaphys-
ical dualism is widely recognised and is a prominent feature of his Meditations, scholars in the
past generation have also focused on the complexity of his natural philosophy, including his work
in physiology, medicine but also on the passions, as displaying something very different: a more
‘integrated’ view of bodily function. See notably the essays collected in Gaukroger et al. (2000).
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deeply different from machines because their parts and activities are non-separable,
and the functions of these parts are not externally imposed, but rather intrinsically
determined. According to Kant (1790/1987), since the activity performed by the
parts of the organism is carried out for their own maintenance, organisms are
intrinsically teleological. As he writes in the Critique of Judgement:
In such a product of nature each part, at the same time as it exists throughout all the others,
is thought as existing with respect to the other parts and the whole, namely as instrument
(organ). That is nevertheless not enough (because it could be merely an instrument of art,
and represented as possible only as a purpose in general); the part is thought of as an organ
producing the other parts (and consequently each part as producing the others reciprocally).
Namely, the part cannot be any instrument of art, but only an instrument of nature, which
provides the matter to all instruments (and even to those of art). It is then – and for this
sole reason – that such a product, as organized and organizing itself, can be called a natural
purpose (CJ, § 65).
This view allows him to open up a gap in the physical world, since organisms
cannot be brought under the rules that apply to all other physical entities. Thus,
Kant asks himself:
How purposes that are not ours, and that we also cannot attribute to nature (since we do not
assume nature to be an intelligent being) yet are to constitute, or could constitute, a special
kind of causality, or at least a quite distinct lawfulness of nature (CJ, § 61).
This “special” kind of causality is circular, namely, effects derive from the
causes but, at the same time, generate them. The very organisation of living beings,
in which the parts generate the whole, and, conversely, the whole produces and
maintains the parts, shows a kind of intrinsic purpose. Kant grounds the idea of
purposiveness (and teleology) in the holistic and circular organisation of biological
organisms and, more precisely, in the fact that they are able to organise by
themselves, to self -organise.8 Unlike artefacts, organisms are “natural purposes”:
they are not produced or maintained by an external cause, but instead have the self-
(re)producing and self-maintaining character that is revealed in the kinds of vital
properties they display (reciprocal dependence of parts, capacity for self-repair and
self-(re)production).
Today, some aspects of the Kantian perspective are undergoing resurgence. For
example, the recent blossoming of systems biology (Kitano 2002; Science, special
issue 2002; Bogeerd et al. 2007), focused on the complexity of biomolecular
interaction networks, is much closer to a holistic or integrative conception of living
systems than the reductionist views predominant in molecular biology. Thanks
to the development of new scientific tools, these more holistic theories place the
question of the organisation at the centre of biological research. This recent trend
contrasts with the preceding history of biology, during which the Kantian view
has often be seen as marginal (even through this view has been corrected by
8Actually, Kant has been one of first authors to use the term “self-organisation”. In Chap. 1, we
will briefly mention how the meaning of this concept has progressively shifted during the 20th
century.
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the recent historiography, see for instance Huneman 2007; Richards 2000; Sloan
2002), essentially because it was thought to be at odds with the model of causality
predominant in Newtonian science.
And yet, the Kantian perspective had continuity in the (mostly Continental)
Biology of the nineteenth century, especially in the work of Goethe and Cuvier
(Huneman 2006). In the first part of the twentieth century, many biologists were
still convinced that the nature of living organisation – understood, following Kant’s
inspiration, as the form in which the parts interact with each other to bring forth
the properties of the whole – was one of the main issues of biology. This view
was commonly labelled organicism (Wolfe 2010; see also Gilbert and Sarkar 2000).
Organicism considers the observable structures of life, its overall organisation, and
the properties and characteristics of its parts to be the result of the reciprocal
interplay among all its components. The organicist tradition was influential in early
twentieth century biology. During the twenties and thirties, a group of researchers,
including Woodger, Needham, Waddington, and Wrinch, created the “Theoretical
Biology Club”, whose objective was precisely to promote the organicist approach
to biology. This movement – in which we can include other authors, like Bernal
and Bertalanffy – was characterised by a predominant anti-reductionist and holistic
inspiration (Etxeberria and Umerez 2006). Among these researchers, the name of
Waddington is worth stressing because his work, after the Second World War,
permitted the connection between the organicist movement of the thirties and the
new tendencies of the sixties and seventies.
To understand the roots of the current blossoming of the “Kantian-inspired
organicist ideas” in biology during the twentieth century, let us mention some other
scientific trends, falling outside the frontiers of biology.
First, during the thirties and forties, a number of physicists associated with the
development of quantum theory, interested in the nature of biological organisation,
turned their attention to biology. Among these scientists, it is worth emphasising
the name of Schrödinger, who gave his famous lectures “What Is Life?” in 1943
(Schrödinger 1944). Following this work, other quantum physicists addressed the
problem of what characterises the specificity of living systems with regard to
physical ones. Among these we can include researchers like von Neumann and
Pauli. Interestingly, the advances in physics inspired new attempts to challenge
reductionist assumptions. For example, Rashevsky, according to his disciple Rosen,
defended
a principle that governs the way in which physical phenomena are organized, a principle
that governs the organization of phenomena, rather than the phenomena themselves. Indeed,
organization is precisely what relational biology is about (Rosen 1991: 113).
During the seventies, Rosen himself and Pattee (Umerez 2001) also developed
an anti-reductionist view of the specific organisation of living systems, based on his
analyses of the specific causation associated with emergent constraints that living
systems generate (see further below).
Second, special emphasis should be put on the cybernetic movement. The
cyberneticists were influenced by the work of the American physiologist Cannon
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(1929) who, in the early 1930s, developed the concept of “homeostasis” (whose
origins date back to the work of the French biologist Claude Bernard9) as a key
feature of the organisation of living beings. According to Cannon, the idea of
homeostasis expresses the tendency of living systems to actively maintain their
identity, despite external perturbations or differences within their environment.
During the 1970s, a new generation of cyberneticists, notably Von Förster, Ashby,
and Maturana, created the so-called second-order cybernetics. This movement was
especially interested in the study and mathematical modelling of biological systems,
based on the ideas of recursivity and closure (Cahiers du CREA 1985). Second-order
cybernetics is of special relevance for our purposes, since it constituted the scientific
environment in which the theory of autopoiesis was elaborated (see below).
Third, after the work of Prigogine (1962), the idea of self-organisation in far-
from-equilibrium conditions began to enter into scientific discourse in physics,
which also helped the Kantian view to gain influence in biology. Yet, as we will
discuss at length in Chap. 1, there is an important conceptual difference between
the Prigoginian concept of (physical) self-organisation and the Kantian notion
of (biological) organisation. As Fox Keller (2007) has pointed out, the kind of
complexity of organisms resulting from an iterative processes of organisation that
occur over time is completely different from the one-shot, order-for-free kind of
self-organisation associated with some kind of non-linear dynamical systems. In
particular, the former is constituted by functional parts, whereas the latter lacks func-
tionality. The logic of the metabolism, for example, shows a functionally diversified
organisation, clearly different in this sense from any physicochemical dissipative
structure. In this sense, as we will see, what we need is a view of biological systems
that goes beyond a generic vindication of an organisational-centred biology. What
matters is the understanding of the specificity of the organisation of biological
systems, which are not just self-organised systems.
In the second post-war period, both the New Synthesis in evolutionary biology
and the revolution of Molecular Biology created a scientific atmosphere that was
quite unprepared to accept organicist and Kantian views (Moreno et al. 2008).
Accordingly, this tradition remained, until very recently, marginal in biology. In this
context, however, Waddington was the main driver of a movement that advocated
an organisational approach in biology, by reviving the “first” Theoretical Biology of
the twenties and thirties (Etxeberria and Umerez 2006). This “second” Theoretical
Biology was initially developed by several pioneering authors like Waddington
himself (1968–1972), Rosen (1971, 1972, 1973, 1991), Piaget (1967), Maturana
and Varela (1980), Pattee (1972, 1973), and Ganti (1973/2003, 1975). Many of
these authors put strong emphasis on the idea that the constitutive organisation
of biological systems realises a distinctive regime of causation, able not only
of producing and maintaining the parts that contribute to the functioning of the
system as an integrated, operational, and topologically distinct whole but also able
9See Bernard (1865) and (1878).
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to promote the conditions of its own existence through its interaction with the
environment. This is essentially what we call in this book biological autonomy.
To give a preliminary idea of what autonomy is about, let us mention one
of its first and well-known accounts, the theory of autopoiesis proposed by the
Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela in the early 1970s (Maturana and Varela
1973; Varela et al. 1974). In the theory of autopoiesis, although the concept of
autonomy is applied to different specific biological domains (immune, neural : : : see
Varela 1979), it characterises the fundamental feature of the living, namely, the
autopoietic organisation. Autopoiesis refers to the capacity of self-production of
biological metabolism, by emphasising (in a simplified and abstract way) its causal
circularity – which Maturana and Varela called “operational closure”. In particular,
their model describes the production of a physical boundary, which is conceived
as a condition of possibility of the internal chemical network (because it ensures
suitable concentrations for the maintenance of the component production network);
in turn, the network maintains the physical boundary (because it is the component
production network which produces the special self-assembling components that
build the membrane). In their own terms (in which the cybernetic flavour is
manifest):
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through
their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete
unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain
of its realization as such a network (Maturana and Varela 1980: 78).
Thus, autopoiesis consists in a recursive process of component production that
builds up its own physical border. The global network of component relations
establishes self-maintaining dynamics, which bring about the constitution of the
system as an operational unit. In short, physical border and metabolic processes are
entwined in a cyclic, recursive production network and they together constitute the
identity of the system. From this perspective, phenomena like tornadoes, whirlpools,
and candle flames, which are to a certain degree self-organising and self-maintaining
systems, are not autonomous, because they lack an internally produced physical
boundary, and are not concrete topological units. In that sense, what distinguishes
self-organisation from autonomy is that the former lacks an internal organisation
complex enough to be recruited for deploying selective actions capable of actively
ensuring the system’s maintenance.
For the purposes of this book, it is worth mentioning two lines of criticism that
have been addressed to the theory of autopoiesis. On the one hand, autopoiesis
conceives autonomy as a fundamental internal determination, defined by the
operational closure between the production network and the physical border. In this
model, interactionswith the environment do not enter into the definition-constitution
of the autonomous system; rather, the interactions with the environment – that
Maturana and Varela called “structural couplings” – follow on from the specific
internal identity of each autopoietic system. On the other hand, Maturana and Varela
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define autonomy in rather abstract and functionalist terms: material and energetic
aspects are considered as purely contingent to its realisation.
On both these issues, the framework that we will develop in this book takes
a different path. The autonomous perspective, we hold, should take into account
the “situatedness” of biological systems in their environment, as well as their
“grounding” in thermodynamics. As a matter of fact, these issues have been at the
centre of the most recent studies on biological autonomy, by authors like Hooker,
Collier, Christensen, Bickhard, Kauffman, Juarrero, and the IAS Research Group,10
who have stressed that the interactive dimensions of autonomous systems in fact
derive from the fact that they are thermodynamically open systems, in far-from-
equilibrium conditions. As these authors have explained, since the constitutive
organisation of biological systems exists only in far-from-equilibrium conditions,
they must preserve an adequate interchange of matter and energy with their
environment or they would disintegrate. For example, in Kauffman’s approach, the
main condition required for considering a system autonomous is that it should be
capable of performing what he calls “work-constraint cycles” (Kauffman 2000). As
Maturana and Varela, Kauffman’s account envisages how autonomy can come out of
the causal circularity of the system; yet, in his view, this circularity is understood not
just in terms of abstract relations of component production but in explicit connection
with the thermodynamic requirements that the system must meet to maintain itself.
In accordance with this literature, we will make in this book a conceptual
distinction between two interrelated, and yet conceptually distinct, dimensions of
biological autonomy: the constitutive one, which largely determines the identity of
the system; and the interactive one, which, far from being a mere side effect of
the constitutive dimension, deals with the inherent functional interactions that the
organisms must maintain with the environment (Moreno et al. 2008). These two
dimensions are intimately related and equally necessary. It might be illuminating
to think of the example of the active transport of ions across the cell membrane,
required to prevent osmotic crises. The cell can be maintained as long as ion
transport is performed, but this interaction can only be carried out because there
is a constitutive chemical organisation providing the membranous machinery that
does the work. In particular, the emphasis on the interactive dimension implies, as
we will stress repeatedly, that autonomy should not be confused with independence:
an autonomous system must interact with its environment in order to maintain its
organisation11 (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004). As we will discuss in Chap. 4, this
is what grounds the agential dimension of autonomy.
10The IAS Research Group – to which the authors of this book belong – has been working since the
last 25 years on autonomous perspective in biology, while extending it to other fields as cognition,
society and bioethics. See also the end of this Introduction and footnote 6 in Chap. 1.
11Hooker has recently defined autonomy as “the coordination of the internal metabolic interaction
cycle and the external environmental interaction cycle so as the latter delivers energy and material
components to the organism in a usable form and at the times and locations the former requires to
complete its regeneration cycles, including regeneration of the autonomy capacity” Hooker (2013).
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Again, there is a reciprocal dependence between what defines the conditions
of existence of the system and the actions derived from its existence: from the
autonomous perspective, in Jonas’s terms, the system’s doing and its being are two
sides of the same coin (see also Moreno et al. 2008). In this view, the environment
becomes a world full of significance: facts that from the outside may appear just
as purely physical or chemical develop into positive, negative, or neutral influences
on the system, depending on whether they contribute to, hinder or have no effect
on the maintenance of its dynamic identity. Even the simplest living organism
creates a set of preferential partitions of the world, converting interactions with their
surrounding media into elementary values, as we will explain extensively in Chaps.
4 and 7. Von Uexküll (1982/1940) called this subjective meaningful world of each
organism Umwelt. The interactive dimension of autonomy is where the nature of
living systems as inventors of worlds with meaning becomes manifest (see also
Hoffmeyer 1996). Indeed, this aspect was recognised by Weber and Varela (2002)
who argued, following Jonas, that autonomy implies a meaningful relation with the
environment.
The autonomous perspective that we develop here endeavours then to grasp the
complexity of biological phenomena, by adequately accounting for their various
dimensions, specificities, and relations with the physical and chemical domains. As
we will discuss throughout the book, our framework differs in many ways from
preceding related models, mainly because we aim at – simultaneously – enriching
and specifying their central tenets, in close contact with current scientific theories.
In the remainder of this introduction, let us give a synthetic overview of the ideas
that we will be advocating.
First, the self-determination of the constitutive organisation remains the con-
ceptual core of autonomy. We share with existing accounts of autonomy the idea
that biological systems are constituted by a network of causal interactions that
continuously re-establish their identity (see also Bechtel 2007). The aim of Chap. 1
will be to provide an explicit conceptual and (preliminarily) formal account of self-
determination in terms of what we will label “closure of constraints”.
Biological systems determine (at least in part) themselves, we will contend,
by constraining themselves: they generate and maintain a set of structures acting
as constraints which, by harnessing and channelling the processes and reactions
occurring in the system, contribute to sustain each other, and then the system itself.
The core of biological organisation is the closure of constraints.We will discuss how
the concept of closure allows specifying what kind of “circularity” is at work in the
biological domain, and how it fundamentally differs from other “process loops”
and self-organising phenomena in Physics and Chemistry. In particular, we will
emphasise that biological closure requires taking into account, at the same time,
the conceptual distinction, and yet inherent interdependence, between two causal
regimes: the constraints themselves and the thermodynamic flow on which they
act. In the autonomous perspective, closure (of constraints) and (thermodynamic)
openness go hand in hand. Self-determination as closure constitutes the pivotal
idea on which we will build our account of autonomy. A first step is made in
the last section of Chap. 1, where we will claim that biological organisation, to
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be such, requires regulation. The long-term preservation of biological organisms
supposes the capacity to self-maintain not only in stable conditions but also, and
crucially, before potentially deleterious internal or external perturbations. In such
circumstances, regulatory capacities govern the transition towards a new viable
situation, be it by countering the perturbations or by establishing a new constitutive
organisation. In all cases, we will account for regulation in terms of a specific set
of constraints, which contribute to the maintenance of the organisation only when
its closure is being disrupted: accordingly, we will argue that regulatory constraints
should be understood as being subject to second-order closure.
Does the autonomous perspective require appealing to some form of emergen-
tism? In previous years, some authors have argued that accounts dealing with
concepts like self-organisation, closure, constraints, autonomy, and related ones
are indeed committed to the idea that biological organisation is an emergent
determination. In Chap. 2, we deal with this issue, advocate a monistic stance,
and provide a twofold argument. First we argue, against exclusion arguments, that
closure can be consistently (with respect to our monistic assumption) understood as
an emergent regime of causation, in the specific sense that the relatedness among
its constituents provides it with distinctive and irreducible properties and causal
powers. Second, although the closure of the constitutive organisation makes sense
of the claim that “the very existence of the parts depends on their being involved
in the whole”, we hold that closure does not imply inter-level causation, in the
restrictive sense of a causal relation between the whole and its own parts (what we
label “nested” causation). Yet, we leave room for appealing to nested causation in
the biological domain, if relevant cases were identified and the adequate conceptual
justification were provided.
With these clarifications in hand, Chap. 3 addresses the question of the distinctive
emergent features of organisms by arguing, in particular, that the closure of
constraints provides an adequate and naturalised grounding for the teleology, nor-
mativity, and functionality of biological organisation. When closure is realised, the
existence of the organisation depends, as we have already emphasised, on the effects
of its own activity: accordingly, biological systems are teleologically organised, in
a specific and scientifically legitimate sense. Because of teleology, moreover, the
activity of the organism has an “intrinsic relevance” which, we submit, generates the
norms that the system is supposed to follow: the system must behave in a specific
way, otherwise it would cease to exist. Hence biological organisation, because of
closure, is inherently normative. And then, by grounding teleology and normativity,
closure grounds also functionality in biological organisation: the causal effects
produced by constraints subject to closure define biological functions. The general
upshot of the analysis, at the end of Chap. 3, will be the deep theoretical binding
between “closure”, “organisation”, and “functionality”: it will be our contention
that, from the autonomous perspective, they are reciprocally defining concepts,
which refer to the very same causal regime.
The constitutive dimension of closure, however, is not autonomy. As mentioned
in the preceding pages, autonomy also includes an interactive dimension, dealing
with the relations between the organism and its environment. We deal with the
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interactive dimensions in Chap. 4, and refer to it as agency, characterised as a
set of constraints subject to closure, exerting their causal effects on the boundary
conditions of the whole system. At the end of the chapter, we argue that a system
whose organisation realises closure, regulation, and agency, as defined in the first
part of the book, is an autonomous system, and therefore a biological organism.
More precisely, Chap. 4 elaborates on a definition of minimal autonomy that
captures the essential features of biological organisation in its (relatively) most
simple manifestations, typically in unicellular organisms.
What has the autonomous perspective to say about more complex organisations
and specifically about multicellular organisms? One of the main weaknesses of the
organisational tradition in biology is arguably the fact that it has never explicitly
addressed the issue of higher levels of autonomy: How many levels of autonomy
can be identified in the biological realm, and what are their mutual relations? In
Chap. 6, we make a first step in this direction: we try to frame the issue of higher-
level autonomy in precise terms and submit some explicit hypotheses on its features.
The central idea will be that what matters for higher-level autonomy is development.
More specifically, multicellular systems are relevant candidates as organisms when
their organisation exerts a functional control over the development of unicellular
components, so to induce their differentiation which, in turn, makes them apt to
live only in the very specific environment constituted by the multicellular system: in
a word, the control over development produces the relevant degree of functional
integration that distinguishes multicellular organisms (as autonomous systems)
from other kinds of multicellular systems. What about the relations between levels
of autonomy? In spite of their differentiation (and then of the loss of some of their
capacities), we will argue that unicellular constituents of higher-level organisms
still meet the requirements of autonomy. In fact, the very possibility of higher-level
autonomy seems to require that lower-level entities preserve an adequate degree
of complexity: multicellular autonomy requires unicellular autonomy. One of the
objectives of Chap. 6 (and partly of Chap. 4, last section) will be, by relying on an
explicit definition of autonomy, to provide relevant criteria for examining different
kinds of higher-level associations and organisations of autonomous systems and
to compare them on theoretical grounds. In particular, our framework could allow
locating them in a continuum of organised systems going from, at one extreme,
those cases fulfilling only the requirements for closure (as ecosystems) to systems
being progressivelymore integrated (as the cyanobacteriumNostoc punctiforme), up
to genuine multicellular organisms (higher-level autonomous systems) at the other
extreme.
The transition to multicellular autonomy paves the way towards cognition, which
is possibly the most amazing innovation during the evolution of life. Cognition,
as discussed in Chap. 7, is much more than a complex form of agency. It is
better conceived as a radically new kind of autonomy whose specific features and
dynamics go, qualitatively, far beyond multicellular autonomy, opening the way
towards our own origins as human beings. In this sense, the analysis of cognition
is related to the nuclear problem of the gap between the “biological” (broadly
understood) and the “human” domains. Yet, the autonomous perspective strives
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to understand and explain cognitive capacities in close connection to a bodily
organisation, which is in turn the product of a long evolutionary process, through
which new phenomena such as emotions or consciousness – and a world of meaning
and values – have been generated. The appearance of cognition is the result of the
evolution towards increasingly higher degrees of both constitutive and interactive
complexity: in this sense, with all its specificities, cognition is still a “biogenic”
(Lyon 2006) phenomenon. By framing the issue of cognition in these terms, we
think that it can be better handled in naturalised terms, without underestimating
the formidable difficulties that any satisfactory account of cognition has to face to
understand its complex nature and phenomenological novelty. Accordingly, Chap. 7
is possibly the most ambitious and yet incomplete, since it sketches in a preliminary
way many problems for which much more work will be required.
Autonomy, as conceived in this book, lies at the intersection between different
dimensions, and specifically the constitutive and interactive ones, on which we put
strong emphasis in the previous pages. Yet, this is not the whole story: autonomy
also has a historical dimension. As we will discuss in Chap. 5, no adequate
understanding of the emergence of autonomous systems (and specifically highly
complex autonomous systems, as present biological organisms) can be obtained
without taking into account the evolutionary process that brought them about.
Autonomous systems are too complex to be spontaneous and cannot self-organise
(in the sense of generate themselves) as dissipative systems do: their complexity
requires an evolutionary process of accumulation and preservation. Yet, in addition
to acknowledging the fundamental place of history in the autonomous perspective,
we will submit two related ideas. First, the historical dimension does not have the
same theoretical status as the constitutive and interactive ones: while the latter two
define autonomy, the former does not. The reason is that we do not need history to
understand what biological systems are, but rather to understand where they come
from: these two questions are of course related, but conceptually distinct. Second,
we will restate the relations between selection and organisation, by advocating the
general picture according to which the evolution of biological systems stems from
the mutual interplay between organisation and selection: this is because, as we
will argue, organisation is a condition, and not only an outcome, of evolutionary
processes.
Having outlined the central ideas of the book, let us point out that it is, of course,
not our intention to develop an exhaustive account of biological autonomy, which
would deal with all aspects and implications of the philosophical and theoretical
framework. Rather, our ambition is to offer a coherent and integrated picture of
the autonomous perspective, by focusing on what we think are some of its central
tenets. Much more could (and hopefully will) be written on biological autonomy,
but we hope that the ideas of this book can be a useful ground on which future
investigations will rely.
This book is the result of a collaboration that goes far beyond that between
the two authors. After having promoted (together with Julio Fernandez, Arantza
Exteberria, and Jon Umerez), more than 20 years ago, the creation of the IAS
Research Centre for Life, Mind and Society, at the University of the Basque Country,
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in Donostia – San Sebastian, Alvaro Moreno has had since then the chance to work
in this highly stimulating intellectual environment. In this respect, a special thought
goes to Francisco Varela, who has been a fundamental source of inspiration for
the creation of the IAS Research group and, for many years afterwards, a close
collaborator and a friend.
Matteo Mossio joined the group in 2008 as a postdoctoral fellow and, after
having moved back to Paris in 2011, maintains close collaborations with many
of its members. Since the constitution of the IAS Research group its members
have collectively developed the autonomous perspective in the biological, cognitive,
biomedical, and ethical domain. The ideas developed in this book, then, are deeply
grounded into the substantive and extensive philosophical and theoretical work
undertaken by our colleagues and friends.12
It then goes without saying that we are intellectually indebted with many people.
Let us thank first those who co-authored previous publications with (at least one
of) us and allowed us to rework and use in this book some of the ideas advocated
there: Argyris Arnellos, Xabier Barandiaran, Leonardo Bich, Maël Montévil, Kepa
Ruiz-Mirazo, and Cristian Saborido. At the beginning of each chapter, we inserted
a note in which we give the references of the specific publications from which some
ideas and text portions have been taken and adapted.
We are sincerely grateful to the other members of the IAS Research Centre for
continuous interactions, over the years, on a variety of topics related to this book:
Antonio Casado da Rocha, Jesús Ibañez, Hanne de Jaegher, Asier Lasa, Ezequiel di
Paolo, and Agustin Vicente. Also, we thank many other researchers with whom one
of us (AM) has worked for a long time: Francisco Montero, Federico Morán, Juli
Peretó, and more recently, Nei Nunes and Charbel El-Hani.
In Paris, the wholeComplexité et InformationMorphologique Team (CIM), at the
Ecole Normale Supérieure, deserves a special mention. Some years ago, Giuseppe
Longo created a small but very active interdisciplinary team, nourished by the talent
of several young fellows: among them, let us thank with special emphasis Nicole
Perret and Paul Villoutreix. We would also like to express our deepest gratitude to
Giuseppe, a remarkably brilliant and profound scientist, for his wise guidance on –
and unfailing support to – Matteo’s academic and scientific trajectory. Recently,
Matteo has been invited, together with some of the CIM members, to join the new
Theory of Organisms research group at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, supervised
by Ana Soto. We warmly thank her, as well as Carlos Sonnenschein and Paul-
Antoine Miquel, for this unique opportunity to engage in stimulating and quality
discussions and exchanges.
Since Matteo’s appointment, the Institut d’Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences
et des Techniques (IHPST) has constituted a privileged scientific environment and
12Over the years, the activites of the IAS Research group have received funding by both Basque
and Spanish public institutions. This book, in particular, was supported by grant IT 590–13 of the
Gobierno Vasco, and grant FFI2011-25665 of the Ministerio de Industria e Innovación.
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provided him with ideal conditions of work. For that, we want to thank its director
Jean Gayon, as well as all the members and colleagues who, in many cases, have
become good friends.
Lastly, we are greatly indebted to those colleagues and friends who took the
time to read and critically comment on early versions of the manuscript: Philippe
Huneman, JohannesMartens, Arnaud Pocheville, and Charles Wolfe. In most cases,
their observations and criticisms were decisive to highlight some of the weaknesses
of the arguments and force us to improve their clarity and accuracy. In this respect,
we owe a lot to Alicia Juarrero, who has not only made a number of precise and lucid
comments on various ideas developed in the book but also crucially contributed to
bringing the initial unstable language closer to correct English. We also want to
warmly thank Juli Peretó for his help in the elaboration of many figures.
The final acknowledgements go to Cliff Hooker: his meticulous, lucid, and
uncompromisingly critical reading of the entire manuscript has induced substantial
changes (and, we hope, improvements!) in the formulation of the ideas, regarding
both the form and the content. Last but not least, he has kindly written the best
foreword we could expect.
Donostia – San Sebastian/Paris
October 7th 2014
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